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Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the 
District Court pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (3) (i), U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Was Defendant denied state and federal Due Process of law 
during the sentencing phase of his conviction for capital murder 
in the first degree by the alteration of the conditional plea 
agreement when the lower court recommended a twenty-year minimum 
sentence? 
APPLICABLE STATUTES TO THIS APPEAL 
Amendment 5, United States Constitution: 
...No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law.... 
Article 1, Section 7, Constitution of Utah: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. 
Rule 11 - Pleas. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
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(Code of 1988) . 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest and shall not accept such a plea 
until the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented 
by counsel he has knowingly waived his right to 
counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury 
trial and to confront and cross-examine in open 
court the witnesses against him, and that by 
entering the plea he waives all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is 
entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution 
would have the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the 
plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him for 
each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of 
a prior plea discussion and plea agreement and if 
so, what agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or 
any other party has agreed to request or recommend the 
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or 
the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be 
approved by the court. If recommendations as to 
sentence are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any 
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court. 
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea 
discussions prior to any agreement being made by the 
prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea 
agreement has been reached which contemplates entry of 
a plea in the expectation that other charges will be 
dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure to him of such 
tentative agreement and the reasons therefor in 
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advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and 
defense counsel whether he will approve the proposed 
disposition. Thereafter, if the judge decides that 
final disposition should not be handled in conformity 
with the plea agreement, he shall so advise the 
defendant and then call upon the defendant to either 
affirm or withdraw his plea. 
PRELIMINARY NOTE 
This appeal is being filed in conjunction with an original 
action for Habeas Corpus before this Court. The Habeas Corpus 
action concerns defendant's claim that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel during sentencing. Because the events of 
this appeal and the Habeas Corpus action concern the same 
sentencing proceeding, some overlap of facts may occur. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 6, 1988 defendant Tracy Eugene Smith was charged 
by the Beaver County Attorney with first degree capital murder in 
the death of James Bray. (R. 1-2). Because Defendant was 
indigent and because a conflict existed with the legal defender's 
office, attorney James L. Shumate was appointed by the court to 
represent defendant Smith. (R. 4). 
A preliminary hearing was held in the Circuit Court of 
Beaver County on October 17, 1988. Circuit Court Judge Robert 
Braithwaite bound Defendant over to the District Court for trial 
as to the criminal offense of capital murder in the first degree. 
On November 14, 1988 Defendant appeared before the Honorable 
Philipe Eves for approval of a plea bargain and sentencing. It 
is during the proceedings that all claimed errors occurred. Some 
of these events are contained in the record. Other circumstances 
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and events are not contained in the record since there has been 
no evidentiary hearing probing the entry of the guilty plea. 
Since both the reported events and claimed unreported events may 
be relevant to the outcome of this case, Defendant will 
distinguish these two classifications by citing to the page in 
the record where the event is reported or by noting that the 
circumstances of an unreported event is being proffered by the 
defendant and supporting testimony will be given at any 
appropriate evidentiary hearing. 
It is undisputed that the victim in this case was a white 
truck driver from Kentucky. Defendant at the time of the death 
was 21 years old, was black, and was driving his automobile from 
California through Utah. The co-defendant Timothy Miller was a 
white hitchhiker who had been picked up by the defendant. 
On October 3, 1988 the victim James Bray entered a restroom 
at a rest stop in Beaver County. Defendant Smith shot and killed 
Mr. Bray while in the restroom. The defendant and Miller were 
subsequently stopped by local police. No personal items were 
taken from Bray nor was any of Bray's property found in 
possession of Defendant. 
Defendant would proffer that at the time of the sentencing 
proceeding on November 14, 1988 his grandmother, sister, aunt, 
and several nieces were present. The family was extremely 
concerned about Defendant's fate. Defendant would proffer that 
he informed his attorney Mr. Shumate that the homicide occurred 
because the victim called Mr. Smith a "nigger", informed him that 
he should get out of the restroom immediatey, and started pushing 
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him physically. 
Defendant would proffer that Mr. Shumate informed Defendant 
and his family that no one in Beaver County would believe that 
story and that his co-defendant Miller was going to testify that 
they intended on robbing the victim. Shumate asserted that 
Defendant would probably be convicted of felony murder and very 
possibly receive the death penalty. Furthermore, Defendant 
would proffer that Mr. Shumate informed Defendant and his family 
that if he plead guilty to the charges and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment, that the state Matrix Guidelines would authorize 
his release in five to seven years based upon his previous 
history and his youth. 
Defendant would further proffer that Mr. Shumate never 
informed him nor his family that the judge could also make 
recommendations as to the number of years that the Board of 
Pardons should retain custody of the defendant and that such 
recommendations were often strictly followed. As such, 
therefore, Defendant would proffer that he agreed to enter into a 
plea bargain in which the dealth penalty would not be sought in 
exchange for a plea of guilty and a sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
Accordingly, Defendant read and initialed the plea 
agreement prepared by the prosecuting attorney and by Mr. 
Shumate. (R. 23-29). A copy of this agreement is contained in 
the Addendum. 
Prior to going into court Defendant would proffer that his 
attorney, the prosecuting attorney, and the attorney for the 
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family, Mr. Hams Chamberlain, met with the court in chambers. At 
the conclusion of the meeting Defendant would proffer that Mr. 
Shumate assured the defendant that the court would accept the 
plea and sentence him to life imprisonment thereby giving the 
Board of Pardons authority to release him under the prison 
guidelines. No mention of any recommendation of a minimum 
sentence was ever made. 
The reporter's transcript of the hearing is contained 
several times in the official record (R. 43-66; 89; 115-139; 
155-179). For purposes of this appeal a copy of the transcript 
is contained in the Addendum herein. References will be made to 
the original page of the court reporter's transcript to avoid any 
confusion with the numerous copies in the record. 
The Court interviewed the defendant in accordance with then 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. (§77-35-11, 
U.C.A.). The defendant answered all of the Court's inquiries 
consistently with the entry of a voluntary plea. At the 
conclusion of the dialogue between the Court and the defendant 
the Court made the following statement: 
All right. Mr. Smith, having in mind all that 
we've talked about today—the possible penalties— 
and I should tell you that if you plead guilty under 
these circumstances, I most likely—most definitely 
will sentence you to serve the rest of your life in 
the Utah State Prison—having that in mind, is it your 
desire to enter into this plea agreement? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, Sir. 
THE COURT: All right. If that's your desire, 
sign the agreement. (Tr. 10). 
The county attorney then explained to the court the theory 
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of the case upon which Defendant would be prosecuted. Basically, 
the state would attempt to prove in a trial that Mr. Smith and 
Mr. Miller had stopped at a rest station in Beaver County with 
the purpose of finding someone to rob. The victim, James Bray, 
entered a restroom and was subsequently shot by the defendant in 
an attempt to rob him. (Tr. 12-13). Subsequently, two men were 
stopped in the town of Salina and a .9 mm weapon was taken from 
them. The bullet from the gun matched that which was found in 
the victim. 
At the conclusion of this explanation the following dialogue 
occurred: 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, you've heard 
the prosecutor's statement as to what the state's case 
would show in his estimation. Let me just ask you a 
couple of questions to determine whether or not 
there's a factual basis for this plea. Did you, in 
fact, shoot James Glen Bray in the rest stop? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, Sir. 
THE COURT: In so doing, were you trying to rob 
him? 
MR. SMITH: No, Sir. 
THE COURT: What was the reason that you shot 
him? 
MR. SMITH: Do I have to—do I have to? 
THE COURT: Tell me what the reason way. 
MR. SMITH: It was more or less—really, to tell 
you the truth—a racial argument. 
THE COURT: A racial argument? 
MR. SMITH: Uh huh. (Tr. 15). 
Subsequently, Mr. Shumate explained that the only evidence 
regarding a purported robbery would come from the testmony of 
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Timothy Miller in that no property of the victim was found in the 
defendant's possession and apparently no property had in fact 
been taken from the victim. (Tr. 16-17). In essence, Mr. 
Shumate stated that the defendant agreed to plea to this case 
even though he disagreed as to the attempted robbery because of 
the "hazard of taking the facts to trial and resting our case 
solely on Mr. Smith's testimony." (Tr. 16, 19). 
After listening to Mr. Chamberlain, the attorney for the 
survivors of the victim, the Court made the following statement: 
I'd like the record to reflect that prior to 
taking the bench here in the open courtroom, all 
counsel and I discussed this proposed plea bargain— 
including Mr. Chamberlain—so that everyone was aware 
of what the proposal was about before I took the 
bench. 
Well, based upon the representations made, I'm 
going to find that there is a factual basis upon which 
the plea may be rested. And I'm going to also find 
that this plea is governed by the provisions of the 
Alford decision—Alford v. North Carolina. And 
I'm going to accept it on both of those bases, and I'm 
going to order the plea of guilty entered. 
Recommendations regarding sentencing in the 
matter? (Tr. 19-20). 
MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, Mr. Smith would ask the 
Court to allow him to waive the statutory time and 
proceed with sentencing at this time rather than to 
order the preparation of a presentence report, in view 
of the nature of the plea and the circumstances of the 
facts before the court. 
I don't think that the Court's sentencing 
alternatives are substantial at all, and we're 
prepared to go forth with that at this time. 
THE COURT: All right. Does the state have any 
objection? 
MR. KANELL: The state does not oppose that. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, just so you're 
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clear on this, the law allows you two days before your 
sentence and up to thirty days for sentencing. And 
you have the right to take advantage of that delay if 
you wish. 
Your counsel has indicated that you want to give 
up that right and be sentenced today; is that right? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, Sir. 
THE COURT: All right. You realize that and I've 
already told you that if I sentence you today, it's 
going to be to the State Prison for the rest of your 
life. Do you understand that? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, Sir. 
THE COURT: And having that in mind, do you still 
wish to waive your right to a delay? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, Sir. 
THE COURT: All right. The record will reflect 
that waiver.. Does either counsel with to present 
anything before I impose sentence? Mr. Shumante? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Smith do you wish to make a 
statement in your own behalf before I impose 
sentence? 
MR. SMITH: I'm sorry for what happened. I wish, 
you know, if he could feel my apology, I know that it 
can't bring him back, but I didn't mean to do it. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. SMITH: That's it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Kanell, anything? 
MR. KANELL: Your Honor, pursuant to the plea 
agreement, the state does not have any evidence of 
aggravating circumstances to present, and the state 
does not request the Court to sentence the defendant 
to the death sentence. 
THE COURT: Does not request that? 
MR. KANELL: Does not request that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
-9-
MR. KANELL: The state requests the Court to 
sentence the defendant to life in prison. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. SHUMATE: I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: All right. Tracy Eugene Smith, having 
been convicted by your own plea of the offense of 
murder in the first degree, a capital offense, in 
violation of the laws of the State of Utah, I now 
sentence you to the Utah State Prison for the rest of 
your natural life. 
I'm also going to make a recommendation to the 
Board of Pardons, which I would like included in the 
order, that Mr. Smith serve twenty years before he is 
considered to be released from the Utah State Prison. 
Anything else? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, Your Honor. (Tr. 20-22). 
Subsequently, on November 23, 1988 a judgment, sentence and 
commitment was signed by the lower court including the provision 
that the defendant not be allowed "parole or even be considered 
for parole until he has served at least twenty years." (R. 
30-31). 
On December 22, 1988 the defendant prepared a "Notice of 
Belated Appeal" while incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, 
Draper, Utah. (R. 33). Defendant filed a supporting affidavit 
which was also notarized on December 22, 1988 which stated in 
part "that appointed counsel assured Defendant that a timely 
court, base upon but not limited to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. That counsel did not fully investigate the facts of the 
case at bar that could have proven the defendant's innocence." 
(R. 34). 
The remainder of the affidavit explained that he was unable 
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to * "*' t .-appointed -i1" rnpy because of h i s 
incarceration i\\ * — ' - attorney as 
to whether appeal ..*.i rt-i-r filed. 
( -h*/ "l^rk •* f -- . s " .ij ' seat a notice to 
th Beaver County Clerk that naa been filed in 
<"dse w , 890027 
On March J was held before the Honorable J. 
Phil, ipe Eves, Defendant was once again rep* e s e H »j«l I y attorney 
James L. Shumalv. Defendant would proffer that in his 
conversations with Mr. Shuirtr . nt r,i mp<i th.it- he could not 
raise any clain •>-' ineffectiveness of counsel »>ri ipp^l in-f ,lidt 
therefore hi? s . • into the federal court nnd file .i haoeas 
corpus action if n»- was unhappy wif.n MI SIIMIM - H S performance. 
""'V'" I 'i«:, i f ,i t"»- e n t r y states the f o 11 o w i i, o 
This matter was called on LUL rearing at the 
request of the defendant* Mr. Shumate informed and 
the defendant concurred that the motion be 
voluntarily withdrawn. Mr. Shumate stated that the 
defendant will pursue his requested relief in the 
federal court system. The appeal was ordered 
withdrawn. (R 86) 
On Hine 29, 1^8 9 a remittitur was issued by this « mi > w^i« »» 
stated t ii '"\ i "ounsel for appellant it is ordered *hat 
this appeal i a 
November ±?t 990 Defendant sen handwritten ; ^ -< <^i e 
Beaver County transcripts ; he ar^ 
proceedings r* -s* . stated ,ded 
report 
On Novembei ^ -• - * } 
Withdraw Guil ^ - filed i 
1 1 -
December 4, 1991. (R. 100-12)- The basis of Defendant's motion 
was his assertion that the lower court should not have accepted a 
guilty plea for capital first degree murder when Defendant 
specifically denied that he was attempting to rob the victim. He 
essentially discounted the testimony of the co-defendant as not 
being believable. 
The Beaver County Attorney Leo Kanell responded to this 
motion by arguing that the testimony of the co-defendant Miller 
would have been sufficient for a jury to believe that an 
attempted robbery occurred during the killing and therefore 
Defendant could have been convicted of first degree capital 
murder and sentenced to death. Moreover, since the defendant 
made his plea to eliminate the risk of the death penalty the 
court was justified under Alford v. North Carolina to accept the 
plea even though he did not admit to the robbery motive. (Tr. 
140-44). 
On February 24, 1992 a memorandum opinion was entered by 
Judge Philipe Eves. (R. 150-53). The court concluded that 
Defendant was incorrect in asserting that there was not 
sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that he was guilty of 
capital first degree murder. The Court stated: 
The state's evidence, though less than 
overwhelming, may well have been sufficient to convice 
a trier of fact that the defendant attempted to commit 
a robbery and shot the victim in the process. 
Certainly the evidence was disputed at best. (R. 
152) . 
On March 23, 1992 this Court acknowledged the Notice of 
Appeal having been filed and assigned this case No. 920141. (R. 
-12-
182) . 
Het einl.in! Shumate has * *~ '*•*<•- appoi nted 
as a district " i4g*- *- r i.*~ ;• . i : >. ;. : . ' 
1LI
 ibep 1 i i aithwaite, the circu t , , . \^ w bound 
Defendant over ; 
additional Fit*.*. '.*:'ri*: Distrn 4 Judge. Judge -\\.fc ^ e s , 
t h e or. i g i '"i -i " is iiww iuc presiding judge of 
that district. 
Defendant's counsel was appointed ". -r^ver County to 
represent the def ei . * ~.\ uie decision of Judge 
Eves denying defendan rcj : :r, -.. withdraw *~Ke 711 il ty nlea. 
F . - Dei. xi - - lef-ndanr appeared before the 
Utah Board Pardons afte^ r,wi;r., •. 
approximately three years. The Board .n apparent deference to 
t *? recommend scheduled a rehearing date 
for possible parole to November 2008 As such, Defendar .e 
: • Lea a total of at least, twenty years before r>-
eligib-t- p~v* i,ny f "er par • , 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
rI \\u ^ f ^ p H n n * > !'1 M:se wis deprived of \ fair sentencing 
hearing- Defendant proffers that he was inevn mlniim 1 u\ ns 
attorney James Shumate that the lower ,:our* w^uld recommend a 
minimum i».-m I ni 1 he totdi sentencing order. 
Defendant does whether the lower court informed Mr. 
e 01 uiib * whether it: was spontaneously decided by 
^-U1"*- a+- *->- s e r i t e i i j ; 1 iiiij , 1 m m ^MK '1 h e fo t met t h e 
defendant should have been informed before entering a plea . f •*«-
was the latter Defendant's counsel should have objected on the 
basis that this recommendation materially changed any agreement 
that Defendant had made concerning his plea. 
The lower court also committed prejudicial error separate 
and apart from that of Defendant's counsel. Under the present 
record there was no basis for the lower court to make a twenty 
year recommendation except for the evidence which was offered by 
the state in support of a conviction. The court on its own 
motion should have either requested additional information 
concerning the circumstances of the crime and the life of the 
defendant or should have made no recommendation whatsoever to the 
Board of Pardons. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an unusual case. Defendant's present counsel was 
appointed for the purpose of representing Defendant in an appeal 
from the order of the lower court denying Defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. After review of the record appellate 
counsel concluded that the lower court was absolutely correct in 
its ruling. Since Mr. Miller was purportedly ready to testify as 
to the intention of robbing the victim there is no question but 
that a jury could have believed Miller's testimony and coud have 
found Defendant guilty of capital murder. The argument that 
Defendant made to the lower court was simply without merit. 
Initially, counsel considered filing an Anders brief 
allowing Defendant to argue his position in spite of counsel's 
belief to the contrary. Appellate counsel has spoken in length 
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with Defendant at the Utah State Prison *rv; . •  :•>.: • t:»l^  '" 
reptHSHiii mi ri Defendant concur? *~ * h ,-, assessment *:\d therefore 
withdraws any appeal based nm ^ PM'vir - >y r aised 
below. 
Undej i i"if;j Anders ' r i ! H > 1 ,i ana ui. ,L State v. 
Clayton, 631 P. 2d 168 (Utah r:»8"P =m - irnev r-i 
c i: "i urn i ,11 defendant may only withdraw :• *• finds * n- •«- be 
wholly frivolous, • .. ^uiuxaw ITIUSL 
r- accompanied ; -f r-f rr. 4 * inv..;: ^  in ^h^ r-pcord 
: -. itnylil 1 rt cue rreao.. State v. Gabaldon, 
735 P. 2d 4J.( -*; - - a Q ^ 
The present situation Is somewhat of a hybrid. The grounds 
raised by ' l'»"" ''efef i n >lous and cannot *-* 
supported un the .*- ^rounds that were not rai-~ 
t : - ow are, in the opinion of counselj meritorious 
and deserve consideration by some i*v, wii.i 'iir1 , 
It i s for thi s reason that two paths are being taken, First 
the instant appeal 1 tfnj unity pi pa agreemen1" =ari'I 
second, t he separate originaj a^t . -n f >r Habeas rut pus foiu'ei n ing 
Defendant's claim of ineffec'iv^ ounsel. 
• " • C . ' ' ' -
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEA OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
THE COURT'S RECOMMENDATION OF A MINIMUM 
TWENTY-YEAR SENTENCE SHOULD BE DELETED. 
Be« .riiist"' HI fuli-vi of rjyiii'Y absolutely waives constitutional 
protections which insulate the accuse*-
admission that the accused has transgressed the laws, it accords 
- 1 t ; _ 
with due process only if voluntarily and intelligently made. 
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962). An 
intelligent plea is the culmination of a rational decision making 
process, in which the accused assesses the numerous factors which 
bear upon his choice of whether to formally admit his guilty or 
to put the state to its proof. The pleas must represent the 
informed, self-determined choices of the defendant among 
practicable alternatives. Van Moltke v. Gilles, 332 U.S. 
708 (1948). 
In determining whether a guilty plea should be set aside 
certain principles of law must be applied. If there is any doubt 
that a plea is not voluntary, the doubt should be resolved in 
defendant's favor. On application to change a plea, all doubt 
should be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits. State 
v. Huttinqer, 595 P.2d 363 (Mont. 1979). 
The question as to whether a plea is voluntarily entered 
will turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. 
Caputo v. Henderson, 541 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1976). When 
claims are made of incorrect or insufficient information as to 
sentencing, the proper test to be applied is whether defendant 
would have pleaded differently had he been correctly informed. 
The burden is upon the state to prove no error and in some 
situations the error may be so egregous that involuntariness may 
be conclusively presumed. Taylor v. Nevada State Prison 
Warden, 607 P.2d 587 (Nev. 1980). 
This Court in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (1987) 
established strict standards that must be utilized whenever a 
plea of 'pjiTty is being taken. This Court stated: 
The details of any plea bargain should ~e .—_' 
forth in the affidavit, as we] 1 as a disclaimer 
concerning any sentencing recommendations as re \ 
by Ri lie 11 (e) . 740 P. 2d at 1313. 
The purpose .-: the Gibbons affidavit requiremen 
ii nsi ure that JL <*nd clearly understood -i^rarnja! 
arrangement exists between a <*< - « - ,a the state. 
Ill State v. Webb, 765 P. 2d 
elabora t e< I > -u l In i, . bargair -f H *- : r q 
The nature of plea bargains requires the excha. 
of consideration, allowing the parties involved to 
reach a mutually desirable agreement A plea bargain 
is a contractual relationship in which consideration 
is passed....In fact, the remedy for a defendant where 
the state fails to fulfil its side of the bargain is 
frequently specific performance....a plea bargain does 
not involve a situation where a defendant willingly 
pleads guilty to a crime, neither asking nor expecting 
anything in return. Id. 
concerning - . ; crimes ,.-...- ^ ; «s 
a deal with the defense counsel that the prosecutor will 
certain recommerhln i M U U I HI HI" S# ek certain penalties it a 
defendant enters .i guilty pLea based upon an agreement that i in-
state will recommend a certain course of action and thn si i"» 
fails to make such reconiniena.il i m * hi M M I M I j y1 [ lea mav be 
withdrawn. State v. Copeland, 7b*> P ,id 1266 ( Utah Ic*h d I In 
I nose s.i i 'i -it- M'inf i I'M I I W M ,'',ii,t [J ays no part in the 
negotiations oound 
the prosecute ;; : . • 
wever, conditional pleas are 
permitted. Rul^ . r ; - : ,j ie^  TTI-^  , 
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Procedure allows an agreement to be disclosed to a court in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge will then 
indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether 
he will approve the proposed disposition. This Court in State v. 
Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986) found that Section 76-3-207, 
U.C.A. as well as Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, permit a trial judge to accept a guilty plea 
conditioned upon the judge's promise not to impose the death 
penalty. The trial court may not refuse to comply with the terms 
of an accepted plea agreement unless circumstances justify the 
declaration of a misplea; otherwise, the double jeopardy clause 
precludes subsequent trial of that defendant. Id. 
In the instant case, the plea agreement clearly stated that 
Defendant's "plea of guilty to the offense of first degree 
murder, a capital offense, is conditional upon the court's 
imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment." (R. 26). The 
plea agreement as conditionally approved by the court prior to 
the hearing did not include any reference to the court's 
recommendation as to the length of a minimum sentence. Likewise, 
at no time prior to Defendant's plea did the Court inform 
Defendant that he would recommend a twenty-year sentence or even 
that he might make a sentence recommendation. The statement made 
by the lower court as to the twenty-year recommendation 
completely changed the terms of the agreement that Defendant 
believed he had obtained. 
As this Court is well aware, a sentence of "life 
imprisonment" up until last year was for an indefinite period of 
time - .screLioii ui the Board of Pardons. 
Defendant would proffei thai he was informed I , Hi- • <n »y 
attorney, and defense attorney, thai" his Matrix Gu idel uies issued 
by the St*i"<=> woul : >i..n t i me of seven years 
incarceratic .•> * * s sentence f ...mature 
j'.'Idei'ii a n lie sentencing availabi;-y by pr aiding ^ :• 
life without parole- S§7b 
U . C . A. 
Had - nat uic iowei ccjr* w-
intending * recommenr twenty-year m^in»im s^nt 5 ver y 
we] ] have declined to enter :i nto the pi ea agreement in 1 ight of 
the c 1 r cumstantial e v i cie 1: 1 < : e t l:i a t t h « t s t a 11 * .i Emitted oossessing1 as 
to the necessary element of attempted robbery, Wh;,e hp ^tate 
can cii""ii}u<:« ll'iril HI recommendati ni ^>1 o i-:-- -• :v • - r;'.:*:. \ 
upon the Board of Pardons * ^ nert . , , . , - • 
factor making a conditional plea agreemer :r-
that • \\ I 11 Pnir cms - • -
recommendation in set": no -% - tr* j«-. - -^ ^pr" . : : „;-; 
the year 2008 conclusively shows '..-A ' r> •— : erommendatirr, .te 
not taken ilghtIy. 
• In. this case one of two things occurred r* + r.t „w 
i ' lforme I Defendant's counsel that !••-• •• ntending 
recommending =» •"wenty-year min f act 
was not ever communicated Defendant ri r=imi y : * 1- it 
"ntciifiril 11 1 In IMII-.I .in - •.-• f , "h»- *ailure •* defense counsel 
under this scenario 1:0 advise Defendan of; tl . iriuu.i 
recommendation in the plea agreement would deprive Defendant • f 
due process of law and effective assistance of counsel. As such, 
any plea that was made by the defendant must be vacated since he 
was unaware of the conditional terms that the lower court had 
established. 
The second alternative is that the lower court did not 
inform Defendant's attorney as to this twenty-year recommendation 
and therefore there was nothing to communicate to the defendant 
and his family. During the entire sentencing proceeding the 
lower court on several occasions mentioned that he would sentence 
Defendant to "life imprisonment" but never mentioned that he 
would recommend a twenty-year commitment. If this be the case, 
the lower court breached the conditional agreement that it had 
entered with defense counsel and Defendant by adding this 
additional provision to the terms of the agreement. Again, 
Defendant would be entitled to vacate the guilty plea or to 
eliminate this extraneous condition to the guilty plea in order 
for the state to claim the benefit of the bargain concerning the 
guilty plea. 
In either case, however, it is clear that the twenty-year 
recommendation of the lower court was an unanticipated factor in 
Defendant's agreement to give up all of his constitutional rights 
of trial. It is submitted that since the record does not 
affirmatively show this condition either in the plea agreement or 
in the dialogue with the defendant prior to his entry of the 
guilty plea that, as a matter of law, the twenty-year 
recommendation must be removed or the guilty plea must be 
vacated. State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992). 
If this Court, however, believes that an evidentiary record 
is needed in this matter to establish the circumstances of the 
plea, it is submitted that the hearing in the habeas corpus 
action will provide this evidentiary basis. The facts of 
counsel's actions will necessarily overlap into the elements of 
the plea bargain. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A TWENTY 
YEAR RECOMMENDATION OF INCARCERATION WHEN 
THERE WAS NO FACTUAL RECORD BEFORE THE 
COURT JUSTIFYING SUCH DECISION. 
Aside from the fundamental breach of the plea bargain 
itself, the recommendation of the twenty-year minimum sentence 
was a clear abuse of disrection and without factual basis. At 
the time of sentencing the Court had absolutely nothing before it 
to justify the imposition of a twenty-year recommendation to the 
Board of Pardons. The Court had no presentence investigation, 
had no information obtained from other sources of a presentence 
nature, did not know anything of Defendant's background, had not 
heard Defendant's version of the death, and was unaware of any of 
Defendant's past circumstances and history. The Court knew 
essentially nothing concerning the circumstances of the death, 
had seen no pictures of the body, did not know how the wound was 
inflicted, and knew nothing that would justify this severe 
enhancement to the normal life sentence imposition. 
While it was proper for the lower court to have entered a 
sentence of life imprisonment based on the plea agreement, the 
enhancement of the twenty-year recommendation was clear and 
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undisputed error. As noted earlier, courts must sentence 
criminal defendants based upon rational and reliable information 
and not upon whim or caprice. A review of the existing record 
shows that this recommendation was without any factual or legal 
basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The waiver of all constitutional rights to trial is a 
serious matter. This Court has repeatedly held the state to a 
high standard of proof to show that a defendant voluntarily and 
knowingly gave up his rights in exchange for a course of action 
by the prosecutor. In the exceptional cases involving 
conditional pleas an even higher standard applies since the court 
itself is involved in the plea negotiations. 
Here, the Court approved the life sentence in lieu of the 
death penalty before Defendant even entered his plea. No 
reference on the record was ever given to Defendant as to the 
twenty-year recommendation. Certainly, if a prosecutor had 
attempted to make this kind of an unanticipated recommendation 
after a plea bargain had been made, a defendant could easily 
claim a material breach. In this case, the lower court was also 
bound not to materially change the basis of the agreement. 
Independent of this breach of the plea bargain, the lower 
court abused its discretion in making the twenty-year 
recommendation when it had no evidentiary basis at all to take 
such a radical action. The sentence of life imprisonment is 
severe enough in a normal homicide—the Board of Pardons has 
tremendous discretion in the number of years a defendant will 
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serve even though the matrix guidelines define a time frame of 
anticipated imprisonmet. The recommendation of a trial court is 
always given considerable weight since it is assumed that the 
court has relevant and accurate information upon which to base 
its recommendation. Here, such assumption is incorrect but the 
Board of Pardons nevertheless followed the twenty-year 
recommendation. 
These errors combined with ineffective counsel during the 
entire sentencing proceeding (as will be developed in the habeas 
corpus action) require vacation of the guilty plea or 
elimination of the twenty-year recommendation. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of November, 1992. 
Craig s/lcook 
Attorney^for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
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STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT REGARDING PLEA AGREEMENT 
,43 I* TRACY EUGENE SMITH, the above-named Defendant, under 
oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of guilty to 
the charge of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a capital offense, as 
contained in the Information on file against me in the 
above-entitled Court, a copy of which I have received, and I 
understand the charge to which this plea of guilty is entered is 
a capital felony and that I am entering such plea voluntarily and 
of my own free will after conferring with my attorney, JAMES L. 
SHUMATE, and with the knowledge and understanding of the 
following facts: 
1. I know that I have constitutional rights under the 
Constitutions of Utah .and the United States to plead not guilty 
and to have a jury trial upon the charges to which I have entered 
a plea of guilty or to a trial by the Court should I elect to 
waive a trial by jury. I know that I have a right to be 
represented by counsel and that I am in fact represented by JAMES 
L. SHUMATE as my attorney. 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial upon the 
charges, I have a right to be confronted by the witnesses against 
me by having them testify, in open court, in my presence and 
before the Court and jury and that I have the right to have those 
witnesses cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have 
the right to have witnesses subpoenaed by the State, at its 
expense, to testify in Court upon my behalf and that I could, if 
I elected to do so,.testify in Court upon my own behalf and that, 
if I choose not to do so, the jury can and will be told that this 
fact may not be held against me if I choose to have the jury so 
instructed. 
^jvp 3. I know that if I were to have a trial, the State 
must prove each and every element of the crime charged to the 
satisfaction of the Court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt; that 
I would have no obligation to offer any evidence myself and that 
any verdict rendered by a jury, whether it be that of guilty or 
not guilty, must be by unanimous agreement of all jurors. 
-2-
;d<> 4. I know that under the Constitutions of Utah and of 
the United States I have a right against self-incrimination or a 
right not to give evidence against myself and that this means 
that I cannot be compelled to testify in Court upon trial unless 
I choose to do so, 
,4 0 5. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Court, I would have 
a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to either the Court 
of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for 
such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State without cost 
to me and that I would have the right to have the assistance of 
counsel on such appeal* 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of 
guilty I am waiving my constitutional rights as set out in the 
five preceding paragraphs and that I am, in fact, fully 
incriminating myself by admitting that I am guilty of the crimes 
to which my plea of guilty is entered* 
H ^ 7. I know that under the laws of Utah the maximum 
sentence that can and may be imposed upon my plea of guilty to 
the charges identified on page one of this affidavit is: 
A. Death or life imprisonment* 
and that the imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my 
plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on 
probation, parole or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of 
-3-
which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my 
plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences 
being imposed on me. 
8. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of 
guilty does not mean that the Court will not impose either a fine 
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been 
made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will be if I plead 
guilty or that it will be made lighter because of my guilty plea. 
9. No one has forced or threatened or coerced me to 
obtain my plea of guilty and I am doing so of my own free will 
and after discussing it with my attorney. I know that any 
opinions he may have expressed to me as to what he believes the 
Court may do are not binding upon the Court. 
ri3 10. No promises of any kind have been made to induce 
me to plead guilty except that I have been told that if I do 
plead guilty, the State has agreed to not request the death 
penalty and to not present any aggravating evidence at the 
hearing before the court. I have also been informed that my plea 
of guilty to the offense of FIRST DEGREE MURDER, a capital 
offense, is conditional upon the court's imposition of a sentence 
of life imprisonment. I understand that should the court impose 
the death penalty, I may withdraw my plea of guilty and require 
the State of Utah to go forward with a trial in the matter. I am 
also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations for probation or suspended sentences, including a 
-4-
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecutor are not binding on the Court 
and may or may not be approved or followed by the Court. 
11, I am not now under the influence of either drugs 
or alcohol. 
^ 3 12. I have read this Statement or I have had it read 
to me by my attorney and I have placed my initials beside each 
paragraph to indicated that I know and understand its contents. 
I am Jj/ years of age, have attended school through 
the l^L- and I can read and understand the 
English Language. I have discussed its contents with my attorney 
and I ask the Court to accept my plea of guilty to the charges 
set forth above in this statement because I didf in fact, 
(1) on the 3rd day of October, 1988, intentionally and 
knowlingly cause the death of JAMES GLEN BRAY, while 
engaged in the commission of an attempted, aggravated 
robbery; 




this / V ^ d a y of Afotsci* btiA 1988. 
TRACY EUGENE SMITH 
Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for TRACY EUGENE 
SMITH# the Defendant above-named/ and I know the Defendant has 
read the Affidavit or that I have read it to the Defendant? I 
have discussed it with the Defendant and believe that the 
Defendant fully understands the meaning of its contents and is 
mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge 
and belief/ after an appropriate investigation/ the elements of 
the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated/ and these/ along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the Defendant in the 
foregoing Statement are# in all respects/ accurate and true. 
DATED this /C/ day of /j/a^^A*?*- , 1988. 
HUMATE* 
ttorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF>PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah 
in its case against TRACY EUGENE SMITH/ Defendant. I have 
reviewed the Statement of the Defendant and find that the 
declarations/ including the elements of the offense of the 
charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal 
conduct which constitutes the offense(s) are true and correct. 
No improper inducements/ threats/ or coercions to encourage a 
plea have been offered to the Defendant. The plea negotiations 
-6-
are fully contained in this Statement and in the attached plea 
agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court, 
There is reasonable cause to believe the evidence would support 
the conviction of the Defendant for the offense (s) for which the 
plea(s) are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the 
public interest. 
DATED this /jti day of Wfrs**^ 1988. 
LEO G. KANELL 
Beaver County Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing 
Statement of Defendant regarding Plea Bargain and the foregoing 
Certificates of Counsel, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that 
the Defendant's pleas of "guilty" to the charge(s) set forth in 
the foregoing Statement be accepted and entered. 
The foregoing Statement of Defendant was signed before 
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THE COURT: We're back in session. It's 20 
minutes to 2:00. 
I111 first call Criminal No. 631, State of 
Utah versus Tracy Eugene Smith. 
MR. SHUMATE: They are just removing the 
handcuffs on Mr. Smith, Your Honor, so that he can have 
the hands in front of him so he can sign this item. 
If I could approach the bench, Your Honor, 
I can give Your Honor a copy of this. We'll keep the 
original while we execute it. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
The record should reflect that Mr. Smith 
is now present with his counsel Mr. Shumate. 
This matter comes on at your request. Did 
you want to tell the Court what we're doing? 
MR. SHUMATE: Yes, Your Honor. This matter is 
before the Court for the arraignment before Your Honor 
and the entry of a plea pursuant to a plea bargain 
agreement entered into between the defendant, myself, 
and the State of Utah, represented by Mr. Kane11. 
The defendant is presently charged with 
first-degree murder, a capital offense. The plea 
agreement contemplates a plea of guilty to be entered 
to that offense on a conditional basis. That is, that 
if the Court were to impose the sentence of death, that 
the conditional plea could be withdrawn. If the Court 
were to impose the sentence of life imprisonment, then 
the plea would stand. 
Mr. Smith and I have discussed the matter 
in substantial detail. The case has been through a 
preliminary hearing and, of course, was bound over for 
arraignment today. The Statement of Defendant 
Regarding Plea Bargain and certificates of counsel have 
been prepared. Mr. Smith has read it; has initialed 
it. He has not yet signed it but intends to sign it 
here in open court before Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Is your full, true, and correct name Tracy 
Eugene Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. And how old are you, 
Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: 21. 
THE COURT: And do you read and write English? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Have you read the Information which 
has been filed in this case against ycu? 
4 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to go through 
that Information with you. It's relatively short. I'm 
going to read it to you now. 
State of Utah versus Tracy Eugene Smith. 
Date of birth, March 16, 1967. 
MR. SMITH: 17th. 
THE COURT: March 17, 1967. I'll make that 
amendment. 
Information in Circuit Court No. 88-CR-ll, 
District Court No. 631. 
The undersigned under oath states on 
information and belief that the above-named defendant, 
Tracy Eugene Smith, committed the following criminal 
offense, to wit: Murder in the first-degree, a capital 
offense, in violation of Section 76-5-201 and 76-5-202 
(1) (d), Utah Code Annotated as amended 1953, in that 
on or about the 3rd day of October, 1983, within Beaver 
County, State of Utah, the said defendant intentionally 
or knowingly caused the death of James Glen Bray under 
the following circumstances. 
"The homicide was committed while the 
actor was engaged in the commission of or an attempt to 
commit an aggravated robbery or robbery." In addition, 
a firearm was used in the commission or in furtherance 
of the felony. 
This Information was based on evidence 
obtained from Raymond Goodwin and Sheriff Kenneth 
Yardley. Signed by Leo G. Kanell, Beaver County 
Attorney. Authorize by presentment and filing by 
Mr. Kanell and subscribed and sworn to by me on the 6th 
day of October, 1988, 
Do you understand the Information, 
Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. You have the right in 
this matter to be represented by an attorney. And you 
are represented by Mr. Shumate standing there beside 
you; is that correct? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And have you had an opportunity to 
consult with him to your satisfaction? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. You also have the right to 
require the State to prove each and every element of 
this offense beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial 
either before the Court or before a jury. 
The elements of the offense which the 
State would have to prove and which you would be 
admitting if you plead guilty in this matter ara 
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these; That on or about the 3rd day of October, 1988, 
within this county and state, you intentionally or 
knowingly caused the death of James Glen Bray while 
engaged in the commission of or attempt to commit 
aggravated robbery or robbery. 
Do you understand those elements? 
MR, SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Now, as I understand the law — and 
correct me if I'm wrong — the firearms enhancement 
does not apply in a capital case. 
Is that correct? There is no firearms 
enhancement? 
MR. KANELL: I'm not aware of any enhancement 
under that section. 
THE COURT: Is that correct? 
MR. SHUMATE: The Court is correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So I won't explain the firearms 
enhancement. 
Do you understand all those elements that 
I just went over? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: If you admit those elements by 
pleading guilty to this offense, then the State doesn't 
have to prove them at all. You'll stand convicted by 
your own statement. 
Do you understand that? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. If you decided to go 
forward with the trial, you would have the right at the 
trial to confront and cross-examine the witnesses 
against you, meaning you would have the right to hear 
them testify and ask them questions through your legal 
counsel. You would have the right not to testify or 
give evidence against yourself, meaning nobody could 
call you as a witness; nobody could make you make a 
statement. And, of course, if you plead guilty, you'll 
make a statement which is the ultimate evidence against 
you. You would have also the right to present any 
evidence you wish to in that trial or to testify if you 
chose to testify. 
Do you understand all those rights? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. If you plead guilty, you 
waive all those rights. The trial — the trial will 
not take place, and you won't have those opportunities 
and those rights I just explained. 
Do you understand that? 
MR. SMITH: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: You have to answer out loud. 
Mo C M T T I I . ^o«= <*•:«, 
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THE COURT: Thank you. If this offense is 
admitted by you, it could be punishable by death, or it 
could be punishable by life imprisonment. 
Normally a trier — a jury would determine 
those — the sentence. You would have a right to have 
a jury determine which of those sentences would be 
imposed if you were convicted of the offense. 
Again, if you plead guilty under the 
conditions of this agreement, this would entail a 
conditional plea, meaning that you would plead guilty 
upon basically a commitment by the Court that a life 
sentence would be the punishment that would be imposed 
as opposed to death. And if the Court, in fact, 
pronounced the death sentence, you would have the right 
to withdraw your plea. 
Do you understand that? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have any 
questions about the nature of the charges against you 
or the possible penalties? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any questions 
about the fact that the State has the burden of proving 
these charges? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Olcay. Do you have any questions at 
all about anything we've discussed to this point? 
MR. SMITH:" No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Has anyone brought any 
force or fear or threat to bear against you to cause 
you to enter into this agreement? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Are you acting freely 
and voluntarily? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of 
alcohol or — 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: -- drugs? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Mental or physical illness? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: So you feel like there's nothing 
impairing your ability to make a decision today? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. Have you reviewed this 
Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are these your initials that appear 
by each paragraph? 
MR, SMITH: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have you signed the document? 
MR. SHUMATE: He has not, Your Honor. We intend 
to sign the document a- this point. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, having in 
mind all that we've talked about today — the possible 
penalties — and I should tell you that if you plead 
guilty under these circumstances, I most likely — mosT: 
definitely will sentence you to serve the rest of your 
life in the Utah State Prison — having that in mind, 
is it your desire to enter into this plea agreement? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. If that!s your desire, 
sign the agreement. 
(Whereupon the agreement was signed.) 
THE COURT: The record should reflect that the 
defendant has, in fact, affixed his signature in the 
presence of the Court. 
I note in reading Paragraph 10 of the 
agreement, that it was also part of the plea agreement, 
that the State agreed not to request, the death penalty 
and net to present any aggravating evidence at a 
hearing before the Court. 
Is that correct? 
MR. KANELL: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is that part of your agreement, 
Mr. Shumate? 
MR. SHUMATE: It is, Your Honor, 
THE COURT: And you understand that, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, have we stated the 
entire agreement as you understand it, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I find that the defendant is acting 
freely and voluntarily. He appears to be alert and 
responsive to the questioning of the Court. He appears 
to know what he's doing and what this plea agreement is 
about. 
Do you agree, Mr. Shumate? 
MR. SHUMATE: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you agree, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, perhaps we could make 
a brief record an that. 
Tracy, your family has also been here this 
morning; is that correct? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
MR. SHUMATE: And you've had an opportunity to 
visit with your mother, your grandmother, your aunt, 
and your sister; is that correct? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
MR. SHUMATE: And they are here in the courtroom 
at this time? Is that also correct? 
MR. SMITH: Yes. 
MR. SHUMATE: And it«s after discussing the 
matter with them and with me and with all of us 
together, that you have determined to enter into this 
decision; is that correct? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
MR. SHUMATE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions at all, 
Mr. Smith, about anything that is contained in this 
Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you feel you understand your 
rights in this matter? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Have I presented an adequate record, 
Mr. Shumate? Anything you can think of I need to do? 
MR. SHUMATE: Yes. I think the Court has. 
THE COURT: Mr. Kanell? 
MR. KANELL: Yes, Your Honor. I think that's 
THE COURT: All right. Are you ready now to 
enter your plea, then, to the charge cf murder in the 
first-degree, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: What is your plea? 
MR. SMITH: Guilty. 
THE COURT: What is the factual basis? 
61 MR, KANELL: Your Honor, the State's case is 
7 that the defendant, Mr. Smith, and another companion 
8 that he had picked up hitchhiking were traveling along 
9 1-15 in a stolen vehicle. 
10 As they came into Beaver County, they had 
11 previously used up their last money for gas for the 
12 vehicle, and they stopped at a rest station north of 
13 town there locking for someone to rob; that a truck 
14 driver by the name of James — excuse me. 
15 THE COURT: James (Slen Bray. 
16 MR. KANELL: James Glen 3ray had stopped at the 
17 rest stop there to — he had made a phone call. He 
18 went into the rest room. That the truck driver was 
19 observed coming into the rest room by a witness who was 
20 in the rest room. He left — as he was leaving the 
21 rest room, he observed a black male enter the rest 
22 room. And as he was — this witness was outside with 
22 his girlfriend, he was — in a short time, he heard a 
24 loud banging sound. He was not sure what it was, but 
25 the black man then came cut of the rest room, walking 
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briskly, got into a car in the passenger's seat of the 
car, and that car drove away. This occurred shortly 
after 8:00 o'clock at night. 
It was dark. The car, as it left the rest 
area, kept its lights off until it got out onto the 
freeway, and then the lights were turned off, and the 
car sped off. 
THE COURT: Turned on, you mean? 
MR. KANELL: Turned on. That's correct, Your 
Honor. 
The witness who was there — and his 
girlfriend — drove on and contacted the sheriff's 
department and gave a description of the vehicle and of 
the black man and the white man that they had 
observed. 
The defendant and a co-defendant, 
Mr. Miller, were observed in the town of Salina and 
were stopped by officers there and questioned. The 
defendant produced a 9mm weapon, which he held on his 
person. That weapon was taken into evidence and was 
analysed by the state crime lab by ballistics experts. 
It was found that the bullet that killed 
Mr. Bray and the shell that was left in the rest room 
matched the bullet or shell that would have been shot 
by that weaoon. 
And that's basically the State!s case, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, you've heard 
the prosecutor's statement as to what the State's case 
would show in his estimation. Let me just ask you a 
couple questions to determine whether or not there's a 
factual basis for this plea. 
Did you, in fact, shoot James Glen Bray in 
the rest stop? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And in so doing, were you trying to 
rob him? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: What was the reason that you shot 
him? 
MR. SMITH: Do I have to — do I have to? 
THE COURT: Tell me what the reason was. 
MR. SMITH: It was more or less — really, to 
tell you the truth — a racial argument. 
THE COURT: A racial argument? 
MR. SMITH: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Mr. Shumate, do you agree that the 
S t a t e ' s e v i d e n c e of the robbery would be as Mr. Kaneli 
has s t a t e d i t ? 
MR. SHUMATE: Ycur Honor, the S t a t e ' s evidence 
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regarding robbery will most likely come from the 
co-defendant, Timothy Michael Miller, in Criminal 
No. 620. 
Mr. Miller was the individual driving the 
vehicle at the time. He has made statements 
implicating at least an intention to seek money at the 
rest areas by means of the gun. 
Mr. Smith and I have discussed the 
potential hazards of taking those facts to trial, and 
he and I have both agreed that the resolution of the 
case as contemplated in the plea agreement is 
appropriate; that the hazard of taking the facts to 
trial and resting our case solely on Mr. Smith!s 
testimony is such that the plea agreement is more 
advisable. 
THE COURT: Is that right, Mr. Smith? 
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THE COURT: Do you understand what your attorney 
is saying? 
MR. SMITH: Pretty much. 
THE COURT: You understand that he's saying that 
even though you disagree with the evidence about 
robbery, that he faels and has so advised you that if 
your co-defendant testifies that you went there to rob 
somebody, that a jury might be swayed by that, and you 
might receive even a more severe penalty — a death 
penalty? Do you understand that? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And having that in mind, is it your 
desire to enter into a plea agreement, knowing that 
61 you're going to be sentenced to prison for the rest of 
7 your life? 
S MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: Is that a satisfactory record, 
10 Mr. Kanell? 
11 MR. KANELL: Yes, Your Honor. 
121 THE COURT: Mr. Shumate? 
MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, perhaps the record 
141 should also reflect that the impetus for the plea 
15 agreement is a weakness in the State!s evidence in 
161 terms that there was no evidence and is no evidence 
that any property or other thing of value was taken 
ISI from the victim there at the rest area. 
19 THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Kanell? 
201 MR. KANELL: That is correct, Your Honor. That 
is a weakness in the State's case. 
THE COURT: So, in fact, there was no actual 
robbery, and your evidence would be basically 




MR. KANELL: That's correct, Your Honor. In 
fact, the Circuit Court bound over cnly on the issue of 
attempted robbery as an aggravated factor. And in the 
plea bargain, I believe it states under the factual 
basis, that it was an attempted robbery. 
THE COURT: All right. Did you understand all 
that, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about 
that? 
MR. SMITH: No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Chamberlain, do you 
want to make a record with regard to your concerns in 
this matter? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes, Your Honor. Ifd like the 
record to show that I represent the family of the 
victim. I've been contacted by them. Specifically by 
Rcwena Hoskins, who is the sister of James Glen Bray, 
the victim in this matter.. 
I've spent a considerable amount of 
time — a considerable amount of time with the 
sheriff's office in reviewing records. I've discussed 
it with Mr. Kanell and Mr. Shumate. Because of their 
concern that justice be served, I have — shortly 
before the lunch hour, I learned of the proposed plea 
PAUT. n Mrvinr r T>T r*oo 
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agreement that has been stated on the record, whereby 
Mr. Smith would plead to first-degree murder as 
outlined on the record. 
I telephoned Rowena Hcskins, reviewed that 
with her, and she has given me authority to indicate to 
the Court that she is in agreement with that plea 
bargain and is satisfied that — on behalf of her and 
the family members — that she has told me she 
represents — that the — that being the wife of 
Mr. Bray, another sister, and a child of Mr. Bray — 
that they are satisfied with a plea of guilty to this 
offense and a commitment of a life sentence — that 
they are satisfied. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. 
Chamberlain. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: I'd like the record to reflect that 
prior to taking the bench here in the open courtroom, 
all counsel and I discussed this proposed plea 
bargain — including Mr. Chamberlain — so that 
everyone was aware of what the proposal was about 
before I took the bench. 
Well, based upon the representations made, 
I!m going to find that there is a factual basis upon 
which the plea may be rested. And I'm going to also 
find that this plea is governed by the provisions of 
the Alford decision — Alford versus North Carolina. 
And I'm going to accept it on both of those bases, and 
I'm going to order the plea of guilty entered. 
Recommendations regarding sentencing in 
the matter? 
MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, Mr. Smith would ask 
the Court to allow him to waive the statutory time and 
proceed with sentencing at this time rather than to 
order the preparation of a presentence report, in view 
of the nature of the plea and the circumstances of the 
facts before the Court. 
I don't think that the Court sentencing 
alternatives are substantial at all, and we're prepared 
to go forward with that at this time. 
THE COURT: All right. Does the State have any 
objection? 
MR. KANELL: The State does not oppose that. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, just so 
you're clear on this, the law allows you two days 
before you're sentenced and up to 20 .days for 
sentencing. And you have the right to take advantage 
of that delay if you wish. 
Your counsel's indicated that you want to 
give up that right and be sentenced today; is that 
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right? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. You realize that and 
I've already told you that if I sentence you today, 
it's going to be to the state prison for the rest of 
your life. 
Do ycu understand that? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And having that in mind, do you 
still wish to waive your right to a delay? 
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. The record will reflect 
that waiver. 
Does either counsel wish to present 
anything before I impose sentence? 
Mr. Shumate? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Smith, do you wish to make a 
statement in your own behalf before I impose sentence? 
MR. SMITH: I'm sorry for what happened. I 
wish, you know, if he could feel my apology. I knew 
that it can't bring him back, but I didn't mean to do 
it. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. SMITH: That's it. 
*ATTT. G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
THE COURT: Mr. Kanell, anything? 
MR. KANELL: Your Kcnor, pursuant to the plea 
agreement, the State does not have any evidence of 
aggravating circumstances to present, and the State 
does not request the Court to sentence the defendant to 
the death sentence. 
THE COURT: Does not request that? 
MR. KANELL: Does not request that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KANELL: The State requests the Court to 
sentence the defendant to life in prison. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. SHUMATE: I!11 submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Tracy Eugene Smith, 
having been convicted by your own plea of the offense 
of murder in the first-degree, a capital offense, in 
violation of the laws of the State of Utah, I now 
sentence you to the Utah State Prison for the rest of 
your natural life. 
Ifm also going to make a recommendation to 
the board of pardons, which I would like included in 
the order, that Mr. Smith serve 20 years before he's 
considered to be released from the Utah State Prison. 
Anything else? 
















THE COURT: Mr. Kanell, will you prepare the 
commitment papers and the judgment? 
MR. KANELL; Would you like — would it be 
appropriate to indicate in the order that a firearm was 
used in the commission of the offense? 
THE COURT: Well, there hasn't been a plea taken 
to that, but I think the factual basis, as we stated 
it, is clear. 
Perhaps what I would prefer you do is 
obtain a copy of the transcript of today's proceedings, 
and you may attach that, if you wish, when we send it 
up to the board of pardons• 
MR. KANELL: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else to be 
taken care of? 
MR. SHUMATE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Good luck, Mr. Smith. 
I need to inform you of one other matter, 
Mr. Smith. You have the right to appeal the decisions 
run today. If you want to appeal, you have to file 
notice of your intent to appeal with the clerk within 
20 days of today's date. If you fail to do that, you 
lose your right to appeal. 
Do you understand your right to appeal? 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
MR. SMITH: Yas, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Good luck. 
(Whereupon the proceedings in the 

















C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) S3 • 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, a Notary 
Public, in and for the County of Washington, State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That, the foregoing matter, to wit, 
STATE OF UTAH VS. TRACY EUGENE SMITH, CRIMINAL NO. 631, 
was taken down by me in shorthand at the time and place 
therein named and thereafter reduced to computerized 
transcription under my direction. 
I further testify that I am not interested 
in the event of the action. 
WITNESS my hand and seal this 23rd day of 
December, 1988. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
/*' *% 
RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 6-17-91 
< ^ 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
IF D m i l ) 
NOV 2!. 1983 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAVER, STATE OF UTAH 




TRACY EUGENE SMITH, : Crim. No, 631 
Defendant : 
The above entitled matter having come on for 
arraignment before the Court on the 14th day of November, 1988, 
and the Defendant, TRACY EUGENE SMITH, being present and 
represented by JAMES L, SHUMATE, and Plaintiff being represented 
by LEO G. KANELL, Beaver County Attorney, and said Defendant 
having plead guilty to the crime of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a 
capital offense, the Defendant having waived his right to 
additional time before sentencing and requesting that he be 
sentenced immediately and the court having conducted sentencing 
proceedings in accordance with Section 76-3-207, Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended, 1953, the Defendant's attorney having 
LEO G. KANELL 
Beaver County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 471 
Beaver, Utah 84713 
Telephone: (801) 438-2351 
made statements to the Court regarding sentence and the Defendant 
making a statement on his own behalf, the State of Utah not 
requesting the Death penalty and not submitting any evidence in 
aggravation of the penalty, the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence 
and Commitment. 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, TRACY EUGENE SMITH, is guilty of the offense of MURDER 
IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a capital offense, as charged in the 
Information in violation of Sections 76-5-201 and 
76-5-202 (1) (d) Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1953, 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 
Defendant, TRACY EUGENE SMITH, is hereby sentenced to a term of 
incarceration for his natural life in the Utah State Prison. In 
addition the court recommends that the Defendant not be 
allowed parole or even be considered for parole until he has 
served at least Twenty (20) years. 
DATED this £2- - day of November, 1988. 
PHILIP EVES 
istrict Ccfeurt Judge 
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COMMITMENT 
The person of said Defendant, TRACY EUGENE SMITH, is 
hereby committed to the custody of the Utah Division of 
Corrections for the purpose of executing the foregoing Judgment, 
Sentence, and Commitment and it is ordered that the Defendant be 
delivered to the Utah State Prison for the execution of the said 
Sentence. 
J 
DATED this #^^day of November, 1988. 
J^ PHILIP EVES 
restrict Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF BEAVER ) 
I, Paul B. Barton, Clerk of said District Court of 
Beaver County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the 
Honorable J, PHILIP EVES, whose name is subscribed to the 
preceding certificate is the Judge of said Court, duly 
commissioned and qualified, and that the signature of said Judge 
to said certificate is genuine. ^ ^BBBBB^^^ 
